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Mariana Caminotti1 and Jennifer M. Piscopo2
Abstract
The conventional wisdom holds that party leaders punish women legislators who
advocate for gender equality. We test this assumption using the Argentine case, asking
two questions. First, who counts as a feminist legislator and how do we know? Second,
do feminist legislators have career trajectories that indicate marginalisation or penali-
sation? We use bill authorship data and expert surveys to identify legislators of both
sexes who champion feminist causes and who adopt a gendered, though not necessarily
feminist, perspective. Comparing these categories of legislators to those in the general
population, we find no meaningful differences in political careers by either legislators’
gender or policy profile. In fact, many feminist champions hold prestigious positions
while in congress, but this political capital results neither in punishment nor reward after
congress. Women who represent women do not go on to the top posts after congress,
but neither do they disappear from public life.
Resumen
De acuerdo con un saber convencional, los lı́deres partidistas penalizan a las legisladoras
que abogan por la igualdad de género. En este artı́culo ponemos a prueba este supuesto
utilizando el caso de Argentina. Para ello, planteamos dos preguntas. Primero, ¿quiénes
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cuentan como legisladoras feministas y cómo se puede identificarlas? Segundo, ¿estas
legisladoras tienen trayectorias que indiquen marginalización o penalización polı́tica?
Utilizamos datos de autorı́a de proyectos de ley y una encuesta a expertos para iden-
tificar legisladores (ambos sexos) que (i) impulsan demandas feministas y (ii) abogan por
los derechos o el bienestar de las mujeres, aunque no necesariamente desde una pers-
pectiva feminista. Al comparar ambos subconjuntos con la población general del Con-
greso argentino, no encontramos diferencias significativas en las carreras polı́ticas.
Muchas feministas ocupan posiciones legislativas prestigiosas, pero no son penalizadas ni
recompensadas al finalizar su mandato. De hecho, cuando culminan su mandato las
mujeres que representan a mujeres no logran los puestos polı́ticos más jerarquizados, ni
desaparecen de la vida pública.
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women legislators, career paths, gender equality policies, substantive representation
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Women’s presence in the lower or unicameral chambers of Latin America’s legislatures
increased from 9 per cent in 1990 to just under 30 per cent in 2019.1 Women’s presence
has transformed politics and policy in the region, with women lawmakers introducing
and winning policies that expand women’s rights (Barnes, 2012, 2016; Franceschet and
Piscopo, 2008; Htun et al., 2013; Miguel, 2012; Piscopo, 2014a; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010).
At the same time, women lawmakers report that representing women carries a price. In
the words of an Argentine deputy who supported gender equality policies, “Taking the
feminist flag creates costs within the party [ . . . ] women with feminist commitments are
dangerous for the party.”2 Her colleague, a prominent feminist lawyer, suggested that
women politicians wishing to advocate for women’s rights “face two options: to break
with party structures or to stay with the party, but without a gender commitment.”3 The
presumption that women legislators committed to gender equality will be stigmatised as
feminists and punished by party leaders appears across Latin America and the globe,
because many feminist platforms challenge entrenched religious or class interests (Htun
and Weldon, 2010). Even left parties do not consistently support women’s rights: left
presidents predominated in Latin America between 1999 and 2016, but many of these
pink tide governments resisted and even rolled back gender equality policies (Blofield
et al., 2017).
Despite the qualitative and circumstantial evidence that political parties marginalise
or punish feminist lawmakers, no studies have explored whether feminist legislators in
fact follow career paths that differ from those of the typical politician. Most evidence for
feminist legislators’ stigmatisation comes from interviews with current or former law-
makers, especially but not exclusively from interviews with women in Latin America
(Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Kantola and Rolandsen Agustı́n, 2019; Marx et al.,
2007; Rincker, 2009). Alternatively, most studies of women politicians’ careers assess
their paths to the legislature, but without distinguishing between women with and
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without feminist profiles (Beer and Ai Camp, 2016; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2014;
Murray, 2012; O’Brien, 2012; Saint-Germain, 1993; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). This article
links these two research agendas, asking two questions. First, who counts as a feminist
legislator and how do we know? Second, do feminist legislators have professional tra-
jectories – operationalised as their posts before, during, and after congress – that indicate
stigmatisation?
Argentina was the first country in the modern era to adopt gender quotas for legis-
lative candidates, passing a 30 per cent quota law in 1991. For this reason, Argentina has
informed pathbreaking studies of women’s legislative representation (Barnes, 2012,
2016; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Htun et al., 2013; Jones, 1997; Marx et al., 2007,
Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). We extend this research, comparing the policy focuses and
political careers of Argentine men and women elected during the pink tide. Our data
cover four cohorts of lower house deputies: those serving the electoral periods of 2001 to
2005, 2003 to 2007, 2005 to 2009, and 2007 to 2011.
We combine bill introduction data with expert survey ratings to identify a group of
“women-focused legislators.” We define “women-focused legislators” as those who
push initiatives that would expand the legal protections or social benefits available
to women constituents. Yet not all issues benefiting from women pose the same threat
to the status quo and not all women are feminists (Celis and Childs, 2014; Htun and
Weldon, 2010). To generate better comparisons, we sort women-focused legislators
into one of two categories: those who champion feminist causes nearly exclusively
(defined as supporting policies that challenge doctrinal or religious values), and those
who adopt a gendered, but not necessarily feminist, perspective (defined as supporting
policies that benefit women constituents without challenging traditional values or
roles). The methodology itself makes an important contribution to the study of
women’s representation, offering more precise ways of disaggregating women’s issues
and classifying the legislators who support them. Once the “feminist champions” are
separated from the “gender supporters,” we draw on existing studies of typical career
paths in Argentina (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2014; Jones et al., 2002; Micozzi, 2014a,
2014b; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011) to compare the professional trajectories of the men and
women in each category to the “typical” men and women legislators.
Our women-focused group is small, which is itself a relevant finding. Of about 900
legislators seated between 2001 and 2011, only forty-six (5 per cent) spent an above-
average amount of time writing bills that targeted women’s issues. Parties are not faced
with large-scale feminist rebellions, which might diminish party leaders’ interest in
policing this behaviour. Looking at women and men within our women-focused group,
we do find sex differences in the types and prestige of posts held before, during, and after
congress, but these differences mirror those found between women and men politicians
in Argentina overall. Consequently, we find few career differences between legislators
who advocate for women and those who do not. Looking at the women lawmakers only,
we find that some feminist champions actually enjoy prestigious posts while in congress,
suggesting that their prestige gives them the freedom to represent women. Yet while
these women are not punished, neither are they rewarded. After congress, neither women
feminist champions nor women gender supporters disappear from public life. Yet they
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also do not receive the most prized posts, no matter whether they held high-profile posts
in Congress or not. Overall, we find that women-focused legislators of both genders,
including feminist champions, enter and leave congress with respectable political
resumes. Feminist legislators may report facing resistance, but such resistance does not
damage their long-term careers.
Our work shows that party leaders do not marginalise or punish feminist lawmakers.
True, our data cannot account for those legislators who support feminist policies but
remain silent, meaning legislators who do not act on their preferences precisely because
they fear the consequences. Reassuringly, however, we show that legislators can speak
out, because neither feminist champions nor gender supporters have careers that differ
much from those of a regular politician. As more women enter Latin America’s legis-
latures, they should feel emboldened to represent women and women’s concerns.
Representing Women – or not – in Latin America
Many empirical studies from Latin America conclude that women legislators advocate
for women’s issues more than men legislators (Barnes, 2012, 2016; Franceschet and
Piscopo, 2008; Htun et al., 2013; Miguel, 2012; Piscopo, 2014a; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010).
These findings hold across varied conceptualisations of women’s interests, whether
scholars define women’s interests narrowly, by looking just at measures that would
upend traditional gender roles (e.g. abortion liberalisation) or broadly, by considering
any measures related to domestic or social affairs (e.g. child welfare). Though most
legislators push women’s rights in a progressive direction (Piscopo, 2014a), not all
legislators who advocate for women are feminists. To acknowledge the heterogeneity
among women and women’s issues, we follow Celis and Childs (2014) in distinguishing
between feminist issues – those that challenge traditional roles – and gendered issues –
those that invoke women’s interests or well-being without challenging traditional roles.
Feminist issues aim to challenge the patriarchal status quo whereas gendered issues do
not, but both sets of issues are women-focused. Gender and politics scholars long have noted
that women’s issues, broadly conceived, are devalued by male-dominated legislatures.
Parliaments, parties, and policies privilege male norms and masculine interests (Love-
nduski, 2005; Miller, 2018). Latin American legislatures follow this pattern (Barnes, 2016).
Women remain excluded from parties’ leadership positions and power structures (Hinojosa,
2012; Wylie, 2018) and do not occupy the most prestigious legislative committees, which
deal with the “hard” policies of finance, defence, and foreign affairs (Heath et al., 2005).
Legislators challenging men’s political dominance may face consequences. Female
legislators confront generalised backlash as their numbers grow, with women’s bodies,
voices, and styles facing hostility and contempt from men legislators (O’Brien and
Piscopo, 2019). All women in parliament may endure systematic harassment simply for
being women (Krook and Restrepo Sanı́n, 2016), but the costs may be especially high for
women promoting feminist causes (Lovenduski, 2005). Conventional wisdom holds that
political parties sideline or silence women expressing feminist ideas – particularly
because these ideas demand a more equitable distribution of political, social, or eco-
nomic power (Htun and Ossa, 2013; Rincker, 2009). A woman deputy in Uruguay who
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pushed for abortion decriminalisation found herself isolated, even though her party had
no formal stance against liberalisation (Barnes, 2016: 197). Women deputies in Brazil
who transcended the ritualised praising of women’s mothering roles and promoted
abortion liberalisation were classified as misfits or deviants (Miguel, 2012). Even in the
more egalitarian Scandinavian countries, women parliamentarians fear being denounced
as “angry feminists” (Kantola and Rolandsen Agustı́n, 2019).
Such stigmatisation and marginalisation occur even though most Latin American
countries have implemented gender quotas, which raise the proportion of women
parliamentarians. On the one hand, quotas may generate mandates for women legis-
lators to represent women, legitimising women legislators’ work on women’s issues.
On the other hand, gender quotas may create perceptions that women are tokens,
unqualified and undeserving of their posts, delegitimising women legislators’ presence
and work (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Krook and Childs, 2012). If the latter
occurs, promoting gender issues becomes especially costly, as doing so reinforces
perceptions about women as troublesome, threatening to the status quo, and unable to
take up “serious” policy matters. Congresswomen in Latin America repeatedly stress
the conflict between supporting their party and advocating for women (Barnes, 2016;
Borner et al., 2009), bolstering notions that women legislators committed to repre-
senting women face a trade-off between their policy priorities and their political
careers. Yet no scholars have used quantitative data to explore whether representing
women has actual career consequences.
Any such assessment must first recognise that political careers are already gendered.
The structural division of labour that assigns women greater domestic responsibilities
means that women politicians have fewer children and are less likely to be married when
compared to men (Black and Erickson, 2000; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2014; Marx et al.,
2007; Saint-Germain, 1993). Women legislators often begin their careers in grass roots
party or community organisations, and have backgrounds in education, public service, and
the non-profit sector – while men have backgrounds in law and business (Black and
Erickson, 2000; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2014; Marx et al., 2007; Saint-Germain, 1993;
Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). To reach congress, women aspirants often need more lower-level
political experience than men (Beer and Ai Camp, 2016): these earlier posts establish
competence, but are not highly valued enough to place women inside parties’ elite inner
circles (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2014; Murray, 2010; Verge, 2011). Once in congress,
women remain excluded from the most prestigious positions, such as committee chairs
(Barnes, 2016; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Differences may become less pronounced as
gender quotas bring more women into legislatures (Barnes and Holman, 2018; Beer and Ai
Camp, 2016), but no studies have examined whether legislators’ careers diverge based on
the policy issues they represent. Do the careers of women who represent women conform
to these already-gendered patterns, or do they diverge in significant ways?
Why Argentina?
Argentina is an ideal case for answering this question. The national quota law, adopted in
1991 and applied in 1993, significantly increased women’s numerical representation. As
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shown in Figure 1, women’s presence in the Chamber of Deputies climbed above 25 per
cent in 1995, remained above 30 per cent from 2001 to 2005, and then rose above 40 per
cent in 2017. Argentine women legislators advocate for gender equality more than male
legislators, especially in the areas of violence against women, sexual and reproductive
health, access to contraception and abortion, and the well-being of children and families
(Barnes, 2016; Htun et al., 2013; Jones, 1997; Marx et al., 2007; Piscopo, 2014b;
Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). For example, from 1989 to 2007, women legislators from parties
across the ideological spectrum authored approximately three-quarters of women’s
rights proposals, and the frequency of their efforts increased as the quota elected more
women to congress (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 410–412).
Yet the Argentine Congress – like its counterparts in Latin America and beyond –
remains functionally adapted to male norms. The introduction rate of women’s rights bills
has increased, but approval rates have declined (Htun et al., 2013). Women deputies tell
scholars that women and women’s interests are devalued (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008;
Marx et al., 2007). Nonetheless, women legislators in Argentina are professional politi-
cians with similar levels of ambition as men (Schwindt-Bayer, 2011), in a context where
parties are highly disciplined and party leaders exercise considerable control over law-
makers’ careers (Jones, 2008; Jones and Hwang, 2005; Jones et al., 2002). Given these
trends, how does specialising in feminist or gendered interests affect legislators’ career












Deputies (%) Senators (%)
Figure 1. Women in the Argentine Congress (1983–2017).
Source: Chamber of Deputies, Argentina (https://www.diputados.gov.ar/export/hcdn/secparl/
dgral_info_parlamentaria/dip/archivos/IE_103_Composicion_HCDN.pdf).
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Answering this question requires two steps: knowing which career paths are valued in
Argentina, and identifying legislators who represent women. To categorise high- and
low-status career paths, we rely on the literature, validated by our expert survey. To
identify women-focused legislators, we combine quantitative bill introduction data with
experts’ qualitative assessments of legislators’ reputation. The next section establishes
our expectations for the Argentine case and explains our method for identifying women-
focused legislators. Because our expert survey informs both steps, we explain the survey
methodology first.
Gendered Pathways to Power
Our expert survey was fielded in June 2016. We asked about legislators’ reputations for
feminist or gendered advocacy and about political parties’ expectations regarding leg-
islators’ career paths, party discipline, and behaviour. We hand-picked sixty-seven
respondents: academics working at universities or think tanks, activists and leaders of
civil society organisations, journalists, and former congressional staffers. The invitation
told experts that the survey explored political careers, legislative activity, and gender,
with no mention of feminist advocacy.
Thirty-two respondents completed the survey, for a response rate of 47.7 per cent. Our
experts were predominantly women (72 per cent of respondents), Argentine citizens (97
per cent), employed by universities (70 per cent), holders of doctorate degrees (73 per
cent), and focused on gender or women’s issues in their current activism or research (76
per cent). Our expert pool was therefore highly knowledgeable about gender politics in
Argentina, making them more reliable than regular citizens. Also, given that expert
respondents with close professional ties to the survey topic are often the most exacting
when judging political actors on that topic (Maestas, 2016), we expect that our
respondents were discerning when assessing legislators’ commitment to women’s issues.
Indeed, we note that most experts were left-leaning: on a five-point ideological scale
where one¼ most left, 70 per cent of respondents chose one or two and the remaining 30
per cent chose three.
Institutions and Career Paths
Argentina’s lower house is elected using closed-list proportional representation, with
provincial-level lists. The 257-member chamber renews by halves every two years, with
each deputy sitting for a four-year term. For the period of our study, 2005–2011, the 30
per cent quota required that one woman appear among every three candidates on the list,
or one in every two candidates when parties or coalitions contest elections for the first
time. This period also saw increasing fragmentation of the party system. The two parties
that had dominated since the return to democracy in 1983 – the Partido Justicialista (PJ)
and the Unión Cı́vica Radical (UCR) – fractured and new parties emerged. The number
of party delegations in the Chamber of Deputies was twenty-nine in the 2005–2007 term,
thirty-three in the 2007–2009 term, and thirty-five in the 2009–2011 term (Directorio
Legislativo, 2012).
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Argentina permits indefinite re-election to both legislative chambers, but the
re-election rate is 17 per cent, the lowest in Latin America (Jones and Micozzi, 2011:
51). Turnover occurs not because voters wish to throw the rascals out, but because party
leaders do not renominate most incumbents (Rossi and Tomassi, 2012: 4). Consequently,
few legislators have seniority, and congress does not cap legislators’ political careers.
Argentine politicians rotate among legislative and executive positions at the federal,
provincial, and municipal levels. The most prized positions are provincial-level exec-
utive posts, which allow access to clientelistic resources (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2014;
Jones and Micozzi, 2011; Jones et al., 2002; Lodola, 2009). In fact, politicians treat
congress as a short-term stop on a path aimed towards executive posts (Lucardi and
Micozzi, 2016; Micozzi, 2014b). Argentine lawmakers are thus amateur legislators but
professional politicians (Jones et al., 2002).
Individual legislators thus depend on party leaders for their current and future
appointments to other political and party offices (Alemán et al., 2009; Jones and Hwang,
2005; Jones et al., 2002; Lodola, 2009; Micozzi, 2014b). Party discipline is high, but
adherence to the party line appears most important in roll-call votes (Alemán et al.,
2009). Legislators use bill authorship and co-sponsorship activity to invest in careers
outside the legislature, by writing bills that target pork to their home provinces, even
crossing party lines to do so (Micozzi, 2014a,b). Generally, legislators are free to express
their individual views – and build their current and future reputations – through bill
authorship and co-sponsorship.
Our expert survey respondents validated these research findings. Only half believed
that party leaders would punish deputies who presented bills outside the parties’ agenda
or cosigned bills introduced by opposition party members. By contrast, 100 per cent
agreed that party leaders would punish deputies for voting against the party in the
plenary. Our experts believed that leaders would punish disloyal deputies by denying
prestigious committee appointments (87 per cent), blocking re-election bids (83 per
cent), and withholding valuable post-congress positions (80 per cent). Since bill intro-
duction offers legislators’ greater initial freedom, we use bill authorship and not roll call
voting to identify legislators advocating for feminist or gendered interests. We then track
their careers by examining their access to leadership posts in congress as well as their re-
election or ascension to valuable executive positions post-congress.
Gender and Political Careers
Importantly, trends in Argentine legislators’ political careers already vary by gender.
Women are far less likely than men to arrive at congress having held prestigious
executive posts (governors, mayors, or cabinet ministers) and are far more likely to have
held legislative posts, typically at the provincial level (Borner et al., 2009; Franceschet
and Piscopo, 2014). Provincial-level legislative quotas partly explain this pattern (Borner
et al., 2009), as does parties’ preference to distribute higher-value executive positions to
men rather than women (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2014). Yet gendered differences in
types of posts do not mean differences in overall political experience, as women have as
much previous political experience as men upon entering the Chamber of Deputies
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(Franceschet and Piscopo, 2014). Low re-election rates further mean both sexes are
newcomers to congress, but not politics.
Women legislators in Argentina may adjust their career expectations to fit the gen-
dered opportunity structure. For example, women and men are equally likely to seek re-
election to the federal congress, but women are less likely to aspire to higher posts after
congress (Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). For women, lacking progressive ambition may con-
stitute a rational response to limited opportunity. Further, leadership opportunities in
congress and executive opportunities after congress also vary by political party, as not all
parties have such spoils to distribute. Women and men depend on party leaders’ favour
for their future careers, but women’s position is especially precarious: already outside
elite networks, they may not risk certain stances in the legislature. On a five-point scale
where one ¼ no punishment and five ¼ definitely punishment, experts rated advocating
for women’s equality a three and demanding abortion liberalisation a four.4
In summary, legislators can express their preferences through bill introduction.
Ambitious women legislators might eschew women’s issues in order to remain in party
leaders’ good graces. Alternatively, women legislators may understand their second-
class status, and may not see representing women as making this status any worse,
especially with mandate effects at work. Therefore, we expect women legislators to be
more likely than men legislators to initiate bills addressing feminist or gendered issues.
However, we also expect that these women legislators, and especially those women
legislators adopting a feminist lens, will occupy the most marginal and least prestigious
posts before, during, and after their congressional tenure.
Identifying Feminist Legislators in Argentina
In Argentina beginning in 2015, movements demanding an end to gender-based violence
(Ni Una Menos) and seeking liberalised abortion (Campaña Nacional por el Derecho al
Aborto Legal, Seguro y Gratuito) gained public prominence and received congressional
attention. We examine a period during which possibilities to promote gender equality
were decidedly more mixed. Our data reflects congressional activity during the pink tide,
the wave of left-wing governments that swept Latin America from 1999 to 2016. We
examine the first and only presidential term of left-wing president Néstor Kirchner, from
the Peronists’ Frente para la Victoria (2003–2007), and the first of two presidential
terms of his wife and co-partisan, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–2011). The
Kirchners pushed human rights and redistribution, and the Congress expanded access to
contraception and penalised violence against women. Yet neither Kirchner adopted a
gender equality plan in the executive branch; the national women’s agency lost status
and funding (Rodrı́guez Gustá et al., 2017); and Fernández curtailed the health ministry’s
programme to distribute contraceptives and tabled legislative measures that would
decriminalise abortion (Pérez Betancur, 2019; Piscopo 2014b; Tabbush et al., 2016).
These developments reflected the pink tide’s overall approach to women’s issues: left-
wing governments promoted class equality while remaining neutral or hostile to dis-
mantling patriarchy (Blofield et al., 2017). Indeed, experts named the Frente para la
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Victoria as among those parties likely to punish deputies for advocating for women’s
equality broadly and abortion liberalisation specifically.
We focus on the legislator cohorts elected to serve the following terms: 2001–2005,
2003–2007, 2005–2009, and 2007–2011. These four-year electoral terms are distinct
from the two-year congressional terms: congressional terms only represent one-half of
legislators’ four-year electoral terms. The Argentine convention of expressing electoral
terms in four-year increments obscures how deputies only sit for three years. Elections
take place in October, but deputies do not sit until March (for instance, a deputy serving
2001–2005 was elected in October 2001, but not seated until March 2002). We draw our
career pathway data from the Directorio Legislativo, a political yearbook published by
an Argentine non-governmental organisation between 1999 and 2011. The Directorio
Legislativo covers politicians’ pre-congress careers, as well as their leadership positions
and committee assignments during the congress, and constitutes the standard source for
studies of Argentine legislators’ career pathways (Barnes and Holman, 2018; Fran-
ceschet and Piscopo, 2014; Micozzi, 2014a, b). To identify women-focused legislators,
we used a database generated by Piscopo (2011, 2014c), which covers all bills intro-
duced in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1999 and 2011. We isolated those
bills introduced by legislators seated in our four electoral terms (about 15,000 bills). We
then identified the bills focused on women, generated a list of authors, and asked experts
to validate the list by qualitatively rating each author’s advocacy on women’s issues.
Generating a List
We first identified which bills addressed a feminist or gendered issue. To do so, we read
the title and summary of every bill. Bill authors write the title and summaries themselves,
and summaries contain strategic pitches about the bill’s aim. To make the first cut, the
title or the summary had to include the word “women” or “girls.” To make the second
cut, the title or summary had to mention the bill’s intention to improve women’s status or
well-being, following Htun and Weldon (2010). However, following Piscopo (2014a),
we excluded bills exclusively aiming to improve child welfare, unless the title or the
summary explicitly linked helping children to helping women. For instance, this coding
process included bills that gave cash assistance to mothers with handicapped children,
but excluded measures to prosecute sex crimes affecting only children.
We then classified the bills as feminist or gendered. Feminist issues meant treating
women as autonomous, rights-bearing subjects in three ways: (i) liberalising access to
contraception or abortion, (ii) promoting equal rights generally (i.e. non-discrimination
laws or gender quotas for the judiciary), and (iii) penalising violence against women or
the sex trafficking of women. Gendered issues meant addressing non-doctrinal topics or
treating women as relational subjects, in four ways: (i) addressing women’s health
outside of reproduction (i.e. breast cancer and anorexia), (ii) expanding employment
benefits, typically maternity leave, (iii) protecting women’s family roles (i.e. conditional
cash transfers based on the number of children), and (iv) expanding the welfare benefits
available to pregnant women and mothers. Importantly, legislators writing gendered bills
may not be feminists. Bills written to expand prenatal healthcare may have anti-abortion
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motivations, for instance. Yet because such bills would still provide women with social
assistance, we only excluded bills that explicitly stated their anti-abortion aims.
Our coding yielded 671 discrete women-focused initiatives, both feminist and gen-
dered, introduced by 202 individual legislators, 103 men and 99 women. Consistent with
Argentina’s low re-election rates, only ten of these legislators (two men and eight
women) served more than once across the four terms. Counting each deputy per election
term – which we do throughout this analysis – yields 213 legislators (105 men and 108
women).5 Women-focused legislators comprise 22 per cent of the roughly 900 legisla-
tors who served between 2001 and 2011. Yet not all 213 legislators show equal amounts
of attention to feminist or gendered issues. The vast majority of men legislators (65 per
cent) entered because they introduced just one women-focused bill per electoral term.
Women legislators averaged 4.1 feminist or gendered bills per term, whereas men leg-
islators averaged 2.2 feminist or gendered bills per term.
Given the relative freedom Argentine legislators experience vis-à-vis bill introduc-
tion, one women-focused bill – whether feminist or gendered – seems unlikely to build a
legislator’s reputation. Most legislators author between five and ten bills per year, with a
modal value of six.6 Since every four-year electoral term corresponds to three years
seated in Congress, a typical lawmaker thus authors eighteen bills. Men and women
Argentine legislators have similar rates of bill authorship but different emphases, with
women dedicating more time to authoring bills on women (Franceschet and Piscopo,
2008; Htun et al., 2013; Marx et al., 2007; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Our data reflect this
trend. Assuming a modal productivity for our women-focused legislators, a woman
legislator who authors eighteen bills per electoral term, 4.1 of which are women-focused,
dedicates about 20 per cent of her total bill authorship time to feminist or gendered
issues. By contrast, the typical man legislator who authors eighteen bills, 2.2 of which are
women-focused, dedicates 12 per cent of his total bill authorship time to feminist or
gendered issues.
We propose that legislators who stand out for representing women – and thus those
positioned to receive punishment, if it occurs – will be legislators whose women-focused
activity is above the average. Said another way, we identified five women-focused
(feminist or gendered) bills per electoral term as the minimum number needed to clas-
sify the legislator as actively promoting women’s issues. Imposing this minimum
reduced our data set to forty-five legislators, thirty-three women and twelve men
(Supplemental Material Appendix 1). Importantly these forty-five legislators are not
necessarily typical: nearly all write more than the modal number of bills, with about half
introducing as many as thirty or forty bills per year. For active lawmakers, representing
women is just one of many priorities.
Sorting Feminist Champions from Gender Supporters
Our forty-five legislators collectively wrote 249 feminist initiatives, compared to 153
gendered initiatives. Nineteen of the forty-five legislators focused on feminist initiatives
two-thirds or more of the time, and twenty-six focused on feminist initiatives more than
50 per cent of the time.7 Overall, the division of attention varies widely, from legislators
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with three feminist bills and two gendered bills (lower end) to those with 20 feminist bills
and three gendered bills (upper end).
Given that legislators author both feminist and gendered initiatives, quantitative data
alone cannot sort the legislators into the categories of “feminist champions” or “gender
supporters.” Bill introduction is not the sole method of feminist advocacy – nor may it
draw party leaders’ attention on its own. We asked our experts to rate legislators’
advocacy on women’s issues, to identify which legislators had reputations for supporting
feminist and gendered issues.
Experts rated legislators in two ways. First, to elicit respondents’ ratings without
priming, we asked experts to name up to five legislators, men or women, serving in the
Kirchner era whom they viewed as “promoting feminist demands.” For each named
legislator, respondents were then shown the list of feminist and gendered issues (gender
equality, contraception and abortion, violence against women, women’s health, maternal
health, employment protection, and general well-being) and asked to rate the frequency
for which the legislator “advocated for” each issue, using a four-point scale. We defined
“advocate for” as “undertaking any of the following activities: presenting or cosigning
bills, participating in public activities, speaking in the media, and debating and voting for
bills in committees and in the chamber.”
Second, we asked experts to rate the legislators from our quantitative list according to
whether they advocated for feminist areas (defined as “the autonomy of women, defying
traditional gender roles”) or gendered areas (defined as “women’s well-being, without
defying traditional gender roles”). Here, we asked about the categories of feminist and
gendered rather than listing the specific issues because we did not expect experts would
know the exact priorities of dozens of individual deputies. To further avoid respondent
fatigue, we determined that legislators introducing ten or more feminist bills – double
our minimum – were clearly feminist champions, and eliminated these names from the
survey. Experts therefore rated thirty-four of our forty-five women-focused legislators.
Our survey responses provided important validation of our constructs of feminist and
gendered issues. We first examined whom experts named in the open-ended question.
Twenty-two different legislators were named (twenty women and two men), with an
average of three or fewer mentions.8 Seven legislators received an above-average
number of mentions (four or higher), all of whom were women. When asked for
which specific issues these seven legislators advocated, 100 per cent of respondents
chose “a lot” or “sometimes” for the feminist issues, and “little” or “never” for the
gendered issues. Experts thus named legislators for their feminist stances. Turning to
experts’ ratings of legislators from our quantitative list, we find that legislators recog-
nised by at least one-third of our respondents (ten legislators, all women) were associated
with feminist advocacy (four legislators) or gendered advocacy (six legislators). Recall,
however, that experts were not shown the names of the clear feminist champions
emerging from the quantitative list.
Combining our two methodologies, we sort feminist champions from gender sup-
porters by using the expert survey ratings to validate the quantitative list. We group as
feminist champions those legislators introducing ten or more feminist bills; those receiving
an above-average number of expert mentions in the open-response question; or those from
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the quantitative list whom one-third or more experts rated as undertaking feminist advo-
cacy. Considerable overlap existed across these criteria. Legislators introducing ten or
more feminist bills also received feminist ratings from our experts, for instance. Only four
legislators – Fernanda Gil Lozano, Juliana Di Tullio, Vilma Ibarra, and Victoria Donda –
were categorised as feminist champions based on expert ratings alone.9 Of these, only
Donda authored no women-focused bills. Donda’s inclusion raised our total number of
women-focused legislators to forty-six, with fifteen categorised as feminist champions and
thirty-one categorised as gender supporters, as shown in Table 1 (for full names and bill
counts, see Supplemental Material). Importantly, our categorisations mean that gender
supporters advocate for gendered issues more than they advocate for feminist issues – but
not necessarily that gender supporters are antifeminist. Our gender supporters likely
represent women from differing ideological perspectives.
The Paucity of Feminist Legislators
The scarcity of feminist champions is itself an important finding. Across four legislative
cohorts seated during ten years, only fifteen lawmakers take enough action on women’s
rights to stand out as feminists. An overwhelming proportion of feminist champions are
women: twelve of fifteen (80 per cent).
Feminist champions come from all major political parties, namely the Peronist parties
(especially the Kirchners’ wing, Frente para la Victoria) and the UCR, as well smaller
left parties such as ARI (which later joined the Civic Coalition), the Socialist Party, and
Encuentro Popular. Feminist champions do not come from smaller right parties, though a
few gender supporters belong to these parties, namely Renovador de Salta and Per-
onismo Federal. Peronist parties account for roughly half the legislators adopting a
gender perspective, reflecting their usually left-leaning platforms and greater numbers in
the chamber during this period.
The scarcity of feminist legislators, combined with the fact that women-focused legis-
lators generally write more bills than their peers, dampens expectations about systematic
differences in careers. True, feminist lawmakers will stand out, becoming more readily
identifiable to party leaders. At the same time, these legislators are active on many issues,
and there are not enough of them to reorient parties’ agendas and to destabilise the status quo.
Party leaders likely have little incentive to treat feminist legislators differently. Moreover,
feminist champions from left-leaning parties, especially those from the Socialist Party, ARI/
Table 1. Counts of Women-Focused Legislators by Category.
Feminist champions Gender supporters Total
Women legislators 12 22 34
Men legislators 3 9 12
Total 15 31 46
Source: Authors’ bill introduction data set and expert survey rankings.
Note: One legislator who was re-elected is counted twice, once for each term.
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Civic Coalition, and Encuentro Popular, do not contradict their parties’ ideological prin-
ciples. Latin America’s left parties may not move aggressively on feminist interests (Blo-
field et al., 2017), but lukewarm enthusiasm does not necessarily translate into retribution.
Having some party members active on feminist issues may even serve left-leaning parties’
interests: parties may deliberately outsource feminist issues to (a few) women, thus reaping
the benefits of being seen to care, without actually changing policies. Though we cannot test
this hypothesis directly, the scarcity of women-focused legislators, especially feminist
champions, suggests that marginalisation may not be detectable in legislators’ careers.
The Career Paths of Women-Focused Legislators
We compare the career paths of our feminist champions and gender supporters, men and
women, to the “typical” career paths for men and women legislators. For typical career
paths, we use trends identified by Franceschet and Piscopo (2014) and Borner et al.
(2009), focusing especially on Argentine politicians’ prioritisation of executive-branch
posts both before and after the federal congress (Micozzi, 2014a; Jones et al., 2002).
Pathways to Congress
Our women-focused lawmakers – like most Argentine deputies – are professional pol-
iticians but amateur legislators. Both the women and the men held previous partisan or
political posts. Some also had past experience in civil society organisations, but their
party resumes are clear. Though congress is not prized among Argentina’s professional
politicians (Lucardi and Micozzi, 2016; Micozzi, 2014b), differences in men’s and
women’s pathways to the legislature still reflect the gendered opportunity structure.
Women hold legislative posts more frequently than men (Franceschet and Piscopo,
2014), and this pattern repeats among our women-focused lawmakers, with more women
than men arriving to the Chamber of Deputies from immediate prior service in either the
federal or provincial legislatures. However, more women (fourteen) than men (six) also
arrived with immediate prior service in either the federal or provincial executive,
including more women (eight) who arrived having held executive posts that would have
managed budgetary or clientelistic resources. This trend suggests that women may need
political capital to make them attractive candidates, and that women coming directly
from prestigious political positions may have the political capital available to invest in
representing women.
Looking at the data proportionally, however, reveals that sex differences among
women-focused legislators resemble sex differences among legislators as a whole.
Between 1999 and 2009, only 33 per cent of women deputies arrived at the federal
chamber having held a resource-rich post at any government level, compared to nearly
50 per cent of men deputies (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2014: 103). In our more limited
data set of women-focused legislators, 24 per cent of women (eight of thirty-four)
previously controlled a resource-rich post, compared to 51 per cent of men (seven of
twelve). Women deputies’ ranking on the electoral lists, an assignment that reflects their
overall stature in the party, reveals similar trends. Generally, women deputies rarely head
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lists: between 1999 and 2009, women occupied just 17 per cent of list-header positions
(Franceschet and Piscopo, 2014: 96). Similarly, among the women-focused legislators,
only 15 per cent of women (five of thirty-four ) headed their parties’ lists. The proportion
was higher for men, at 33 per cent (four of twelve).
An important difference does appear when looking within the group of women-
focused legislators, however. All women and men deputies with past access to cli-
entelistic resources are gender supporters. Of the list headers, four of five women were
gender supporters and three of four men were gender supporters. Here, we find sug-
gestive evidence that feminist champions are more frequently outside the parties’ inner
circles than gender supporters.
Positions in Congress
Are women-focused legislators disadvantaged or marginalised once in the Chamber of
Deputies? We cannot compare the timing of bill introduction to power shifts within party
delegations, but we can ask whether our gender supporters and our feminist champions
occupy the “mega-seats,” meaning the leadership positions in congress (Carroll et al.,
2006). We define mega-seats as membership in the Mesa Directiva (leadership table),
which consists of the chamber president and the first, second, and third vice-presidents;
leaders of the political party delegations (often referred to as “delegation presidents”);
and chairs of legislative commissions (also called “presidents”). These mega-seats are
limited in their availability, with the majority party having control over many of them,
and so they are highly prized – but also unavailable to most legislators (Micozzi, 2014b),
not just women-focused ones.
Since Argentina’s return to democracy, no woman has served as president of the
Chamber of Deputies. Women attained this position first during the 2003–2005 con-
gressional term. Seven women served as vice-presidents between 2003 and 2011. Of
these seven women, two appeared in our data set, one feminist champion (Marcela
Rodrı́guez) and one gender supporter (Graciela Camaño). No men in our data set held
these positions.
These trends continue when looking at delegation and commission presidents. His-
torically, very few women have led their parties’ delegation: of the 135 delegations
seated between 2001 and 2011, only 27 per cent (thirty-seven) had women presidents
(Directorio Legislativo, 2012). Two of these women appear in our data set, both feminist
champions (Juliana Marino and Silvia Augsburger). An additional three women, two
feminist champions and one gender supporter, became delegation presidents in a future
congressional period (discussed below). By contrast, no men legislators focusing on
women’s issues appeared as delegation presidents in a current or future congressional
period. Turning to committees, eight women in our data set led commissions during their
tenure, compared to just three men. Five of the eight (two feminist champions and three
gender supporters) presided over prestigious commissions, including the most important
– Constitutional Affairs – as well as General Legislation, Penal Legislation, Judicial
Politics, and Freedom of Expression.10 Overall, we find evidence that women active on
women’s issues, especially feminist champions, held prestigious posts, but that men
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active on women’s issues did not. Said another way, men legislators who represent
women occupy lower ranks in the chamber.
Taken together, access to chamber, delegation, and committee presidencies echoes the
patterns uncovered in women-focused legislators’ antecedents. Argentine women deputies
remain under-represented in the most prestigious posts, as do women feminist champions
and women gender supporters. However, several women legislators in each category do
manage to access clientelist resources, head electoral lists, or occupy prestigious leadership
positions. These posts are distributed among different women in our data set, meaning the
prizes do not accrue to the same one or two individuals over time.
We thus find little evidence of stigmatisation or penalisation across the thirty-four
women legislators who represent women. Men legislators who represent women are also
not marginalised, but in the chamber they occupy absolutely and relatively fewer
positions of power when compared to women legislators who represent women. Men
legislators, whether feminist champions or gender supporters, do not appear among the
most powerful men deputies. We thus conclude that some prestigious women deputies
do represent women, perhaps because they have the political capital to do so. Most
prestigious men deputies, however, do not represent women.
Representing Women without Penalisation
The most important test of whether legislators representing women experience mar-
ginalisation or stigmatisation comes from their post-congress trajectories. Party leaders
determine members’ future careers, and will reward or punish their deputies based on
their congressional records. We focused on deputies’ immediate post-congress position,
as this position would be the one most directly affected by their behaviour and actions in
the congress.
First, women-focused legislators, both women and men, continue in politics. Twenty-
one of the thirty-four women, and seven of the twelve men – roughly 60 per cent for both
genders – assumed a political post immediately upon the conclusion of their electoral
term. This figure includes seven of the twelve women feminist champions, and all three
men feminist champions. We thus find scant evidence to suggest that promoting feminist
or gendered issues in the Argentine Congress disproportionately harms women’s polit-
ical careers.
Second, gendered career patterns persist. Of the seven men continuing in politics, four
(57 per cent) received legislative posts; the remaining three entered the executive branch
(one governor, one mayor, and one non-cabinet level provincial post). By contrast, of the
women continuing in politics, eighteen of the twenty-one (86 per cent) received legis-
lative posts: twelve were re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies, two were elected to the
Senate, and four entered subnational legislatures. This outcome reflects the reservation
of executive posts for men. Since Argentina’s re-democratisation in 1983, only seven
women have served as provincial governors and just 10 per cent of mayors have been
women.11 The inability of women legislators representing women to become governors,
mayors, and provincial cabinet ministers reflects men’s dominance of the executive
generally, not the penalisation of feminist champions or gender supporters generally.
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While we find no evidence that women deputies representing women are penalised
after the congress, we also find no evidence that women deputies go on to occupy
high-status posts. Yet we previously concluded that several women deputies repre-
senting women held high-profile leadership posts during their electoral terms. In other
words, the political capital that women feminist champions and women gender sup-
porters have in congress – as evidenced by their position as chamber vice-presidents,
delegation leaders, or commission presidents – does not translate into powerful
positions after congress. The inverse is true for men. Among men, very few feminist
champions or gender supporters held high-level posts during their electoral terms, but
the vast majority attained executive posts after exiting the Chamber of Deputies. Men
politicians lack formal leadership in congress but still receive rewards after congress,
whereas women politicians exercise formal leadership roles without receiving future
benefits. Women legislators representing women are not penalised, but neither are
they promoted.
Nonetheless, the vast majority of women legislators who represent women devel-
oped long-term resumes worthy of respect. Many women feminist champions,
including those who lacked an immediate post-congress position, eventually attained
executive (but not cabinet) posts. Marı́a José Lubertino directed the National Institute
against Xenophobia and Racism and later the Observatory for Peoples with Dis-
abilities. Paula Cecilia Merchán led the National Committee against Trafficking and
the Exploitation of Persons. Juliana Marino became ambassador to Cuba. These
positions did not give access to clientelistic resources, but did offer influence over the
human rights policies central to the Kirchners’ agenda. Similarly, women continuing in
the legislative branch attained decent positions. Several women entered the Buenos
Aires city legislature, one of the most relevant lawmaking bodies in the country. Four
women, three feminist champions and one gender supporter, were re-elected to the
federal chamber and later became leaders of their parties’ delegation. One feminist
champion – Juliana di Tullio – had challenged her government’s opposition to abortion
decriminalisation while presiding over the Women and Family Commission. Despite
her open disagreement, she later became the first woman to lead the Peronist dele-
gation in congress.
The remaining feminist champions also found themselves, at moments beyond their
initial post-congress period, occupying or running for significant offices. For instance,
Margarita Stolbizer ran for governor of Buenos Aires province three times. Though she
lost, her candidacy to govern the most populous and important province signified her
high rank within her party (first UCR and then GEN).
Overall, feminist champions had opportunities after congress. Executive-branch
initiatives on disability, racism, or human trafficking might hold less value, precisely
because institutional hierarchies privilege issues associated with men and masculinity,
but these offices remain relevant and visible. Other feminist champions moved into more
institutionally prominent posts, leading congressional delegations and running for
governor. Women who represent women do not overly prejudice their long-term careers,
neither at the national nor the subnational level.
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Conclusion
As women have entered Latin America’s legislatures in significant numbers, they have
reported experiencing stigmatisation or marginalisation based on their feminist advo-
cacy. Their stories inform the longstanding assumption that, for women lawmakers,
representing women’s issues carries political costs. Much of this conventional wisdom
comes from work conducted on Argentina (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Marx et al.,
2007), and we test this assumption on this case. We compare the career trajectories of
men and women “women-focused” legislators to the career trajectories of the average
men and women legislators. Earlier research showed significant gendered patterns in
Argentine deputies’ careers (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2014), but without tying patterns
to legislators’ policy profiles.
We begin by carefully identifying which legislators take up the feminist flag, offering a
method of identifying women-focused legislators that relies on objective measures of bill
introduction and subjective ratings by case experts. Because we propose that career
penalties are most likely experienced by legislators who present the largest challenge to the
status quo, we compare legislators active on feminist issues to legislators active on gen-
dered issues. This method itself makes an important contribution, as it recognises the
heterogeneity among women and women’s issues. We conclude that while many legis-
lators, especially many women legislators, take modest actions to represent women
(i.e. writing one women-focused bill), only a small subgroup of legislators dedicate sig-
nificant portions of their time to representing women. An even smaller portion dedicates this
time to championing feminist issues. Overall, challenging the patriarchal status quo occu-
pies very little space on the legislative agenda. Perhaps feminist issues are rarely addressed
precisely because legislators fear punishment. At the same time, the scant number of
feminist legislators indicates that expectations of punishment may be overblown.
Indeed, our analysis of career pathways reveals no systematic differences between
women-focused legislators and “typical” legislators. We compare along gender (women
versus men) and along policy profile (feminist champions versus gender supporters),
finding only small differences. Feminist champions arrive to congress without any
earlier access to clientelism, but many feminist champions hold high-profile leadership
posts once in congress, and attain executive-branch positions after congress. Feminists
are outside parties’ inner circles before congress, but incorporated once they arrive.
Prominent men deputies do not push women’s issues, while prominent women deputies
do represent women. This trend, though based on a small sample size, raises the question
of whether deeply committed feminists forge careers to attain the political capital nec-
essary to represent women, or whether their accumulated political capital allows them to
openly express their preferences. This question urges future researchers to design their
interview questions with an eye to disentangling causality.
Overall, we find that the gendered career paths of women and men do not diverge
based on legislative specialisation. This finding holds for both feminist champions and
gender supporters. Women politicians’ careers are marked by more service in the leg-
islative branch than the executive, and women remain excluded from the resource-rich
executive positions that allow officeholders to control clientelism. We thus conclude that
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women legislators who represent women are neither systematically penalised nor sys-
temically rewarded. Women legislators who represent women confront and overcome
the same gendered barriers as their women peers.
This conclusion suggests that gender equality policies in Latin America may stall or
fail, but not necessarily because feminist advocates face backlash – at least not any
backlash detectable in career consequences. Yet the question remains why women
politicians report experiencing marginalisation and punishment for representing women.
This finding, which largely results from qualitative interviews with sitting lawmakers,
may depend on varied understandings of penalisation. Legislators may conflate the
pushback they receive on particular policy proposals with prejudice against their long-
term career prospects. Legislators may emphasise penalisation in interviews with
researchers, especially when legislators know the researchers are focused on barriers to
feminist advocacy. More careful ethnographic research and interview techniques could
deepen scholars’ understanding of how backlash obstructs women’s political careers.
Such research must also account for changing times. We studied a period when left-
wing governments dominated Latin America, when the context towards advancing
gender equality policies appeared, if not welcoming, at least not inhospitable. With the
end of the pink tide and the rise of right-wing governments, scholars and commentators
now fear the arrival of a more conservative era, in which hostility towards women,
women lawmakers, and women’s rights is more visible, pronounced, and aggressive
(Blofield et al., 2017; Restrepo Sanı́n, 2019). Future work should compare the present
moment to the pink tide, asking whether Latin America’s turn to the right has made the
possibility of punishment more real in the present day.
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Notes
1. Data from 1990 from Blofield et al. (2017: 348). Contemporary figure calculated from the
Inter-Parliamentary Union: https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month¼6&year¼2019
(accessed 31 July 2019).
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2. Authors’ joint interview with female ex-deputy from the UCR party. Buenos Aires, 10 August
2014.
3. Piscopo interview with activist on gender issues. Buenos Aires, 8 August 2014.
4. Modal responses.
5. Of the eight female deputies, seven served two terms and one served three terms (having resigned
halfway through her first term to take a ministerial post, she later completed two full terms).
6. Figure courtesy of Juan Pablo Micozzi, computed with data from 2001 to 2007. This figure
accounts for legislators who author no bills at all.
7. That is, for nineteen legislators, feminist initiatives amounted to 67 per cent or more of their
total women-focused initiatives.
8. Thirty-two individuals were named, but only twenty-two served during our period of study.
The average number of mentions was still less than four.
9. Ivana Marı́a Bianchi (2007–2011) was demoted due to her anti-abortion stance.
10. At the time of our study, the Kirchner government faced a protracted, highly contested and highly
controversial reform over media regulation, making this legislative commission very important.
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